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Abstract 
 
Recently, a variety of organisations, including car and consumer electronics manufacturers, have applied 
so called IP Pledges. They facilitate access to Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) for a large group of third 
parties through a reasonable price or, in some cases, even entirely free of charge. Despite growing 
research to better understand IP Pledges, its underlying terminology remains contradictory. With this 
paper we contribute to building an established ontology of IP Pledges through proposing a definition and 
a taxonomy to distinguish different types of IP Pledges. Applying an inductive research approach, we 
analyse 59 pledges through a secondary data analysis. Based on the analysis, we propose a three-
dimensional framework that can be used to distinguish eight types of IP Pledges. Extending this 
framework with examples from the literature we then propose an IP licensing taxonomy that can be used 
to distinguish IP licensing-strategies, including patent pools, cross-licenses, and trade secrets. Finally, we 
use this IP Licensing Framework to illustrate the paths IP owners take as they change their licensing 
strategies over time.  
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1. Introduction 
Firms dealing with Intellectual Property (IP) have never failed to challenge existing theories that aim 
to explain why and how companies use Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). For instance, the 
consideration of the revenue effect and the profit dissipation effect introduced by Arora and Fosfuri 
(2003) cannot explain why firms like Tesla Motors give away their patents for free (i. e. without 
demanding royalty payments). While these effects and further theories play an important role in the 
classic licensing literature, the increasingly complex business environment and its novel licensing-
approaches require some adaptation and extension of existing research. Especially the rise of open 
innovation and open source software caused some rethinking of long-established aspects within an 
organisation, including their attitude towards IP strategies (Chesbrough 2006; Hippel and Krogh 2003; 
Lerner and Tirole 2002). Subsequent, the announcement made by Tesla in 2014 triggered an ongoing 
debate inside and outside the academic world and has often been coined an Open IP Strategy or IP 
Pledge. While Tesla’s IP Pledge might be the most popular one, it is by no means the only one. A less 
known example for freely available IPRs is the bundle of patents and trademarks relating to the QR 
Code. Even though such IP Pledges become increasingly frequent, they are far from new (Burnett 2011; 
Contreras 2018). In sum, the rise of IP Pledges, alongside with the increase of other IP licensing 
approaches such as patent pools, requires some rethinking of current IP-licensing theories and 
definitions.  
 
This demand for more research has been recognized by many scholars, some of which produced 
seminal works in the area of IP Pledges (see for example Contreras and Jacob (2017)). The relatively 
rapid and simultaneous research, however, is followed by ambiguity: Academic scholars and industry 
professionals alike utilize terms, such as IP Pledges and Open IP, in inconsistent ways. For some, only 
IPRs that are entirely free of charge and available to the unrestricted public constitute an IP Pledge. 
Others include the access to IPRs on reduced licensing-fees available only to a certain community in 
their definition. This inconsistency hinders the comparison of academic work and impedes the 
communication between IP professionals.  
 
The paper addresses this problem by first proposing inductively derived definitions of IP Pledges and 
Open IP; second, by proposing a taxonomy of IP Pledges consisting of eight mutually exclusive types; 
third, by proposing an IP licensing taxonomy that puts IP Pledges into perspective to other common 
licensing types, such as patent pools and cross-licenses. Both taxonomies are based on secondary 
sources: The taxonomy of IP Pledges is being inductively derived from publicly available IP licensing 
statements, whereas the IP licensing taxonomy constitutes an extension thereof and is validated using 
case examples. With these taxonomies, we aim to facilitate the distinction between different types of 
IP Pledges and other IP licensing types by positioning them in relation to each other, making it possible 
to recognize differences as well as similarities. Hence, we contribute to the ontology of IP licensing 
theory. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly summarises the description of IP Pledges in the 
literature and contrasts existing definitions against each other. Section 3 describes the data collection 
and qualitative coding process and lays the groundwork for the taxonomy development. Subsequently, 
in section 4 we elaborate a definition for IP Pledges and Open IP and describe the IP Pledge taxonomy 
and the IP licensing taxonomy. Section 5 discusses the results and specifically focusses on changing 
licensing-approaches of case examples within the context of the IP licensing taxonomy. Lastly, section 
6 concludes by focussing on contributions, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
IP Pledges are a phenomenon that gained significant traction over the last couple of years. As Contreras 
(2017) states, despite major importance of IP Pledges in both, the legal and economics literature, its 
formal study did not begin until 2012. However, these strategies are not new. Burnett (2011) provides 
examples of organisations that applied what he calls ‘Forfeiture actions’, dating back to the 1940s. 
These actions inherit essential similarities to what we call IP Pledges, including the reasonable price 
for the respective IPRs and its broad availability. Despite this early occurrence of IP Pledges in the 
business environment, the focus on this phenomenon in the literature remained scarce. Allen (1983) 
was one of the first scholars to specifically investigate the free exchange of knowledge between firms. 
While not particularly mentioning the terms IP Pledge or Open IP, Allen describes the ‘free exchange of 
information about new techniques and plant designs among firms’ as a requirement for collective 
invention (Allen 1983, p. 2). 20 years later, Harhoff, Henkel, and Hippel (2003) follow up on this idea 
by defining ‘the free revealing of information by a possessor as the granting of access to all interested 
agents without imposition of any direct payment’ (Harhoff, Henkel, and Hippel 2003, p. 1753).  
 
After these early works, an increasing number of scholars started paying attention to IP Pledges. The 
modern research of IP Pledges can be broadly divided into two ‘camps’, according to the definition 
respective scholars use: On the one hand, some authors define IP Pledges strictly as the access to IPRs 
without any monetary compensation. For example, Ziegler, Gassmann, and Friesike (2014) state that 
‘Patent release or give away for free means that in contrast to classic licensing and cross-licensing 
agreements, there is no contractual definition of compensation from the receiving end to the original 
patent holder’. Similar definitions are provided by Raasch, Herstatt, and Balka (2009), Schultz and 
Urban (2012), Alexy, George, and Salter (2013), Asay et al. (2015)1 and Sundaresan, Jena, and Nerkar 
(2017).  
 
                                                             
1  Asay et al. (2015) mention monetary compensation in the context of FRAND, which we understand as 
being not included into ‘patent pledging’ as the authors define it. 
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On the other hand, some scholars widen their definition of IP Pledges by including the access to IPRs 
on reasonable royalty-rates. For instance, Chander and Sunder (2004) broaden their definition of a 
Public Domain by adding the option to demand a nominal fee rather than no monetary compensation 
at all. This idea is also supported by, Contreras (2015), Contreras and Jacob (2017) and Contreras, Hall, 
and Helmers (2018). Chesbrough (2003) promotes this definition specifically in the context of Open 
Innovation.  
 
So far, Contreras and Jacob (2017) provide the most detailed classification of IP Pledges. They 
distinguish between the price and its underlying calculation third parties have to pay to access the 
respective IPRs and describe three broad categories: Primary Accessibility Commitments, Secondary 
Royalty Commitments and Non-royalty Commitments of IP owners. While this empirically derived 
categorization is, to our knowledge, the first transparent distinction of IP Pledges, it is also entirely 
price-focused. Other characteristics, such as who is entitled to use the IPRs and on what conditions, 
have been left out.  
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Table 1 contradicts definitions of IP Pledges described in the literature. It is important to note, 
however, that not all scholars use the term IP Pledge. In order to retain validity, we searched for the 
content of definitions rather than the terminology itself. 
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Table 1: Existing definitions related to IP Pledges or Open IP. 
Definitions including monetary compensation Definitions excluding monetary compensation 
‘Resources for which legal rights to access and use for free 
(or for nominal sums) are held broadly.’ 
Chander and Sunder (2004, p. 1338) 
‘Patent release or give away for free means that in 
contrast to classic licensing and cross-licensing 
agreements, there is no contractual definition of 
compensation from the receiving end to the original 
patent holder’ 
Ziegler, Gassmann and Friesike (2014, p. 19) 
‘Patent pledges are [public] commitments voluntarily 
made by patent holders to limit the enforcement or other 
exploitation of their patents.’ 
Contreras (2015, p. 787) 
‘OSI [Open Source Innovation] is characterised by free 
revealing of information on a new design with the 
intention of collaborative development of a single design 
or a limited number of related designs for market or non-
market exploitation.’ 
Raasch, Herstatt, and Balka (2009, p. 2) 
‘Pledge commitments fall into three general categories: 
(1) the primary commitment to license patents, either on 
royalty-free or FRAND terms, or not to assert patents at 
all...’ 
Contreras and Jacob (2017, p. 13) 
‘Patent pledges are promises by patent holders not to 
enforce their patents under certain conditions.’ 
Schultz and Urban (2012, p. 30) 
‘Thus, under a pledge model, patent assets are retained by 
their owners, who continue to incur maintenance and 
other fees, but the offensive use of such patents is 
significantly curtailed.’ 
Contreras, Hall and Helmers (2018, p. 1) 
‘We define selective revealing as the voluntary, purposeful, 
and irrevocable disclosure of specifically selected 
resources, usually knowledge based, which the firm could 
have otherwise kept proprietary, so that they become 
available to a large share or even all of the general public, 
including competitors.’ 
Alexy, George and Salter (2013, p. 272) 
 ‘Parties are increasingly engaging in “patent pledging,” a 
phenomenon where parties voluntarily commit to limit 
enforcement of their patent rights.’ 
Asay et al. (2015, p. 261) 
 ‘An open IP strategy is any strategy that allows external 
inventors and firms the use of technology developed by the 
focal firm without any financial or cross-licensing 
obligation.’ 
Sundaresan, Jena and Nerkar (2017, no page number 
given) 
 
 
To conclude, some scholars support two different definitions of IP Pledges: IP Pledges that demand a 
(reasonable) fee for the usage and IP Pledges that do not demand any monetary compensation at all. 
This inconsistency impedes the comparison between different results, leading to a contorted 
understanding of IP Pledges. While Contreras and Jacob (2017) provide a classification of IP Pledges, 
it is price-focussed and leaves out further characteristics of IP Pledges. 
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3. Research approach 
3.1 Data collection 
As a first challenge we had to decide on which ‘IP initiatives’ to be included in this study, hence which 
could be classified as a pledge as they all have varying characteristics. As a starting point, we used the 
collection of IP Pledges provided by Jorge Contreras.2 The list contains 178 statements in which 
organisations pledge to apply a range of specific IP practices. However, the entries of this list are 
organisation-specific, meaning that every organisation that pledges a specific IP practice is counted as 
one entry (apart from the Open Invention Network). In order to avoid the inclusion of identical 
pledges, we take a different approach by summarising organisations that take part in the same 
initiative, counting pledges rather than individual organisations. Hence, our unit of analysis are distinct 
pledges rather than organisations. To further clean the data, we excluded 13 entries: (1) The 
facilitation for prior-art searches (‘The Clearing House’, Microsoft, Yahoo, SAS), (2) the promise to 
enable/improve the community review of IPRs (IBM), (3) entries with vague formulations (Novell’s 
patent policy from 2014, Allergan’s social contract with patients), (5) the promise not to sell IPRs to 
non-practicing entities (Verizon, Cisco Systems), (6) entries with a lack of information (John Gilmore, 
‘Patent Licensing Principles’ by Conversant), (7) an entry with the strict restriction to qualified 
customers (Microsoft’s Azure IP Advantage programme), (8) the mere statement of availability of 
licenses without the specification of standardized or reasonable terms (Microsoft). Furthermore, we 
added ‘The GreenXchange initiative’ and all IPRs relating to the QR-Code technology to our unit of 
analysis, because they specifically address the availability of IPRs on standardized terms. 
 
In total, we collected data for 59 IP Pledges, comprising 118 distinct organisations.3,4 The unit of 
analysis covers 261 pages of DIN-A4 PDF-files. Only in the cases of GreenXchange and the Eco-Patent 
Commons (both do no longer provide an active website), we rely on empirical data and descriptions 
provided elsewhere (Awad 2015; Contreras, Hall, and Helmers 2018). The complete list with 
information about number, type, and area of technology is provided in the appendix. 
 
3.2 Data analysis 
We coded the data in two cycles with the software NVivo™. In a first coding cycle, we followed the 
qualitative analysis approach of conventional content analysis, meaning that we avoided preconceived 
categories by allowing common themes to emerge directly from the raw data (Hsieh and Shannon 
                                                             
2  The collection is publicly available on the website of the American University Washington College of Law 
under http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments. We sincerely thank Jorge Contreras for his 
collaboration, specifically for his readiness to share the collected data and provide us with the original 
statements. 
3  The ‘Open Invention Network’ (OIN) is counted as one firm since its 2700+ members would distort the 
results significantly. Ericsson, Sony, Sony Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Nokia Siemens Network, Xerox and 
Fuji Xerox are counted separately.  
4  Some of the collected statements are no longer available on the respective organisation’s website. 
However, PDF-files are available from us upon request.  
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2005; Kondracki, Wellman, and Amundson 2002). Through initial coding we ensured to stay open to 
new explorations by limiting the influence of our own subjective judgement (Charmaz 2006; Saldaña 
2009). In a second coding cycle, specifically through Pattern Coding, we revisited the data in order to 
reorganise and adapt initial concepts (Saldaña 2009). We structured the emerging concepts by 
summarising them into 1st order codes, 2nd order codes and aggregate dimensions, as described by 
Gioia et al. (1994) (see Figure 1. See also Corley and Gioia 2004). Specifically, the dimensions 
Accessibility, Compensation, and Conditions emerge.   
 
 
Figure 1: Emerging dimensions from the coding process. 
 
3.3 Taxonomy development 
We use an inductive research approach based on secondary data to develop a taxonomy of IP Pledges. 
The terms taxonomy and typology are often used interchangeably in the literature (see for example 
Nickerson, Varshney, and Muntermann 2013). A crucial difference between these terms is that the 
former consists of mutually exclusive sets while the latter relates to a set of ideal types. Importantly, 
only taxonomies provide decision rules that allow the classification of different organisations (Doty 
and Glick 1994). We avoid the common problem of merely summarising existing research in typology-
based theory-building by using secondary data that have not yet been analysed (Cornelissen 2017). 
Furthermore, since our dimensions emerge directly from the collected sample, we are confident that 
the dimensions provided are representative. The three dimensions fulfil the criteria of parsimony, 
which Nickerson, Varshney, and Muntermann (2013) describe as the manageable number of 
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dimensions in order to prevent overextension. At the same time, however, our proposed dimensions 
allow for a clear distinction from each other. Since every collected IP Pledge can be assigned to specific 
values on every dimension, our taxonomy can be described as being comprehensive (Nickerson, 
Varshney, and Muntermann 2013). Lastly, the aggregate dimensions are not finite, which is a critical 
taxonomy attribute relevant for the development of our second taxonomy, the IP licensing taxonomy 
(Nickerson, Varshney, and Muntermann 2013).  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Definition of IP Pledges and Open IP 
We develop a definition of IP Pledges that consists of elements that, to our understanding, are essential 
to the collected sample and can be consistently applied to all pledges. These elements are namely the 
three dimensions Accessibility, Compensation and Conditions alongside the fact that we only consider 
IPRs that are active (meaning the respective IPRs are not lapsed) and pledges that are publicly 
announced (meaning that in theory, the unrestricted public can access the information). Therefore, we 
define IP Pledges as follows: 
 
‘An IP Pledge is a publicly announced intervention by IP owning entities (‘pledgors’) to 
license-out active IPRs to the restricted or unrestricted public free from or bound to certain 
conditions for a reasonable or no monetary compensation using standardized written or 
social contracts.’ 
 
The term reasonable in this context refers to fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND-
terms). We follow the definition of FRAND-terms described by Sidak (2013) and Hausman, Leonard, 
and Sidak (2007). According to the authors, FRAND-terms can be economically determined by 
describing a hypothetical scenario of negotiations between the licensor and the licensee. A reasonable 
royalty rate falls somewhere between the patent holder‘s minimum willingness to accept and the 
would-be infringer‘s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) (Sidak 2013).5 Therefore, a reasonable 
royalty rate is considered lower than the maximum willingness to pay by the potential licensee, which 
is an important characteristic for our second taxonomy, the IP licensing taxonomy described later in 
this paper. The maximum WTP of a potential licensee can be summarised as the maximum price he is 
willing to pay for the license for which he assumes to still being better off than without a license (Sidak 
2013). It is important to note, however, that the maximum WTP can be averaged among the elements 
of interest, which results in the mean WTP. Many studies apply mathematical models and statistical 
methods in order to calculate the mean WTP for a specific business area (see for example Buckland et 
al. 1999; Poe, Welsh, and Champ 1997). This value serves as a directive for a rough estimate of common 
                                                             
5  We follow the definition of WTP, or reservation price, provided by Varian (1992) (see also Wang, 
Venkatesh, and Chatterjee 2007; Miller et al. 2011). 
 11
royalty rates in a specific industry. For instance, the average royalty rate in the automotive industry is 
given as 4.7 % of the sales price, whereas in Pharmaceuticals it is estimated to be 7.0 % (Poltorak and 
Lerner 2004). While the proposed taxonomies attempt to be general rather than technology-specific, 
we leave the calculation of mean WTP-values for distinct business-areas aside.  
 
Since the terms IP Pledges and Open IP are often used interchangeably of each other, we develop a 
definition for Open IP as well. We propose that Open IP should be seen as one particular type of IP 
Pledges, where the IP owner announces the availability of certain IPRs free of charge to the 
unrestricted public. Importantly, the IP owner, still, can specify certain conditions. Therefore, we 
define Open IP strategies as follows:  
 
‘Open IP strategies are an IP Pledge made by IP owning entities (‘pledgors’) to license-out 
active IPRs to the unrestricted public free from or bound to certain conditions for no 
monetary compensation using standardized written or social contracts.’ 
 
4.2 Taxonomy of IP Pledges 
In order to distinguish different types of IP Pledges, we divide each of the three aggregate dimensions 
that emerged from the data analysis in two parts, according to our 2nd order concepts. Hence, we 
propose eight different types of IP Pledges. Subsequently, we define each dimension and the values it 
can take.  
 
Accessibility is a measure for the potential recipients of the respective IPRs. According to our sample, 
IP Pledges are either addressed to a large number of third parties or to the public in general. The 
dimension Accessibility can take the values Restricted Public or Unrestricted Public. Importantly, the 
value Restricted Public is only concerned with the a priori restriction to specified licensees and must 
not be confused with the dimension Conditions described below. An example might clarify this point. 
Toyota pledges the availability of specified patents only ‘to automakers who will produce and sell fuel 
cell vehicles, as well as to fuel cell parts suppliers and energy companies’. This IP Pledge restricts the 
number of potential licensees from the outset. On the other hand, IBM’s IP Pledge from January 2005 
does not restrict licensees a priori, but the use of their IPRs is subject to a specified condition: ‘IBM 
hereby commits not to assert any of the 500 U.S. patents listed below, as well as all counterparts of these 
patents issued in other countries, against the development, use or distribution of Open Source Software.’ 
This distinction is crucial, since in the former example only specified third parties can make use of the 
IP Pledge (=Restricted Public), while in the latter theoretically anyone, subject to specific conditions, 
has access to the respective IPRs (=Unrestricted Public).  
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Compensation refers to the monetary compensation the IP Pledgor demands in exchange for the 
license. Our sample shows that IP Pledges are either made on what the licensor broadly calls a 
reasonable compensation or entirely free of charge. As described above, a reasonable compensation in 
the literature is considered to be below the mean WTP. Hence, the dimension Compensation can take 
the values ‘Below mean WTP’ or ‘None’.  
 
Table 2: Conditions in IP Pledges.  
Condition Example 
Non-assertion clause  
(in 21 out of 59 IP Pledges) 
‘A party is “acting in good faith” for so long as such party and its related or aﬃliated 
companies have not: asserted, helped others assert or had a financial stake in any 
assertion of (i) any patent or other intellectual property right against Tesla or (ii) 
any patent right against a third party for its use of technologies relating to electric 
vehicles or related equipment (...)’ 
Source: Tesla Motors IP Pledge, Status: February 2019 
Limitation to specific usage 
and/or territory 
(in 19 out of 59 IP Pledges) 
‘The policy also broadens Microsoft’s commitment to provide the academic 
community with IP under royalty-free terms for noncommercial use.’ 
Source: Microsoft IP Pledge, 12-03-2003 
Subject to reciprocity 
(in 7 out of 59 IP Pledges) 
‘Qualcomm has had a long standing policy of broadly offering to license its 
standards essential patents for CDMA-based telecommunications standards on 
terms and conditions that are fair, reasonable, and free from unfair discrimination 
(FRAND), subject to reciprocity.’ 
Source: Qualcomm IP Pledge, 2008 
Limited duration 
(in 5 out of 59 IP Pledges) 
‘Patents related to fuel cell vehicles will be available for royalty-free licenses until 
the end of 2020.’ 
Source: Toyota IP Pledge, 2015 
Attribution 
(in 3 out of 59 IP Pledges) 
‘As a condition of the copyright grant, you must include an attribution to the 
Specification in any derivative work you make based on the Specification.’ 
Source: OWF 0.9 (Copyright grant). Status: February 2019 
Written agreement to abide 
the IP Pledge 
(in 1 out of 59 IP Pledges) 
‘Thus, Google will require any person or entity to whom it sells or transfers any of 
the Pledged Patents to agree, in writing, to abide by the Pledge and to place a 
similar requirement on any subsequent transferees to do the same.’ 
Source: Google Open Patent Non-assertion pledge. Status: February 2019 
 
Conditions is a measure for any condition that is part of the usage for the respective IPRs. Our unit of 
analysis shows that 45 out of 59 IP Pledges are subject to explicitly mentioned conditions. The coding 
process revealed six categories of conditions listed in Table 2 in descending order of frequency. In the 
IP Pledge taxonomy, we further distinguish the conditions according to the influence they have on the 
respective IP usage: Specifically, we summarise conditions that restrict the usage in either space or 
time as direct conditions. In our sample, direct conditions are the restriction to a specific field / 
territory or a time-limitation for the license. In contrast, indirect conditions do not affect the IP-usage 
in either space or time, such as the promise not to assert IPRs against the licensor (non-assertion 
clause).  
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Figure 2 shows the proposed taxonomy of IP Pledges. Following, we describe each of the types by 
providing an example. In this description, we do not particularly add the dimension Conditions, since 
the conditions described in Table 2 can be equally applied to all types of IP Pledges.  
 
 
Figure 2: The taxonomy of IP Pledges. 
 
A Priced IP Pledge is a pledge made from an IP owning entity by announcing the general availability 
of licenses. Importantly, the compensation Below Mean WTP must be equally available to all interested 
parties. An example is the IP Pledge from NTT DoCoMo et al. from 2002, in which they pledge the 
availability of licenses relating to the W-CDMA technology to the unrestricted public for ‘a cumulative 
royalty-rate below 5 %’.  
 
A Restricted IP Pledge describes the free availability of licenses for the restricted public. The merger 
‘ThePatentPledge’6 is an example for this type of IP Pledge in which 35 organisations pledge not to 
assert their software patents against firms that employ less than 25 people. Another example is 
Toyota’s IP Pledge from 2015, in which they announce the free availability of IPRs relating to the fuel-
cell technology to ‘automakers who will produce and sell fuel cell vehicles, as well as to fuel cell parts 
suppliers and energy companies who establish and operate fuelling stations, through the initial market 
introduction period’.  
 
                                                             
6  www.thepatentpledge.org. Status: February 2019. 
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An Open IP Pledge constitutes the free availability of IPRs to the unrestricted public. Tesla Motors’ 
pledge from 2014, for instance, falls under this category. Even though there has been much criticism 
of its initial inaccuracy, Tesla now provides an explanation of terms and conditions on its website: 
‘Tesla irrevocably pledges that it will not initiate a lawsuit against any party for infringing a Tesla Patent 
through activity relating to electric vehicles or related equipment for so long as such party is acting in 
good faith’.7 In this case, the compensation is restricted to technologies relating to electric vehicles and 
is also condition to a non-assertion clause.  
 
Our sample did not include a Restricted, Priced IP Pledge. One reason for that might be the intention 
of IP-owning organisations to, if they decide to license-out IPRs in order to generate revenue-streams 
through royalty-rates, they do not want to restrict potential licensees.  
 
The distribution of our sample across the eight types of the IP Pledge taxonomy emerges as a result of 
the coding process. Exemplary, the distinction between an IP Pledge available to the Unrestricted Public 
and an IP Pledge available only to the Restricted Public can be easily identified. For instance, the Max 
Planck Gesellschaft states in its IP Pledge from 2006 not to assert some of its patents against third 
parties that ‘sell or use DNA vectors which induce production of siRNA endogenously’. In contrast, Tesla’s 
IP Pledge does not restrict licensees in that way: ‘Tesla irrevocably pledges that it will not initiate a 
lawsuit against any party...’. The same applies consistently to specifications of the compensation and 
the conditions. In total, 22 IP Pledges of our sample (37%) are classified as a Conditional Open IP Pledge, 
13 as a Conditional Priced IP Pledge (22%), 10 as a Conditional Restricted IP Pledge (17%), 8 as a Priced 
IP Pledge (14%), and 3 as an Open IP Pledge and Restricted IP Pledge (5%) respectively. Our sample did 
not show IP Pledges that can be classified as a Conditional Restricted Priced IP Pledge and Restricted 
Priced IP Pledge. The IP Pledges in our sample can be further allocated to different areas of 
technologies. 46 out of 59 IP Pledges (78%) relate to the area of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). 6 IP Pledges (10%) can be allocated to technologies that aim to be beneficial for the 
environment; 4 (7%) can be assigned to biotechnology and genetics. 3 IP Pledges are made by 
automobile manufacturers, 2 of them (3%) relating to electric vehicles (Tesla Motors and Ford) and 1 
(2%) to the fuel-cell technology in general (Toyota). For the allocation of individual IP Pledges to the 
taxonomy-types and technology-areas, we refer to the table provided in the appendix.  
 
4.3 The IP licensing taxonomy 
As Nickerson, Varshney, and Muntermann (2013) point out, an important characteristic of a reliable 
taxonomy is that its dimensions can be extended. Therefore, in order to depict more IP-licensing 
approaches, we extend the dimensions Accessibility and Compensation of the IP Pledge taxonomy. We 
                                                             
7  The IP Pledge and further clarifications of its terms are available at 
www.tesla.com/en_GB/about/legal#patent-pledge. Status: February 2019 
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then provide purposefully, non-randomly selected examples of organisations described in the 
academic literature in order to verify these extensions and the resulting taxonomy-types (Eisenhardt 
1989).  
 
Specifically, we extend the dimension Compensation by adding the values Mean WTP, Above Mean WTP 
and High-Priced. The dimension now ranges from high-priced to free of charge. The relationship 
between FRAND-terms and the WTP, which is the maximal price at which a customer would by a 
product or service (Varian 1992), of a potential licensee is described by Sidak (2013) and has been 
summarized above. For specific technology areas, there exist specific values for the mean WTP. 
Therefore, the IP licensing taxonomy should be used with regards to specified technologies. 
 
The dimension Accessibility is being extended by adding the values Selected Clusters, Selected Parties 
and None and therefore ranges from no potential recipients to the unrestricted public. While the term 
Cluster often refers to the geographical location of firms, we use the term to address a conglomerate of 
entities defined by the licensor.8  Therefore, a cluster in the context of the IP licensing taxonomy is a 
number that falls somewhere between Selected Parties and Restricted Public. Loosely speaking, when 
an organisation specifies a cluster, it abandons some control over the number of the potential 
recipients by addressing a specific group of organisations that can change without the influence of the 
licensor. This stays in contrast to the value Selected Parties, in which the licensor addresses specifically 
named organisations, while retaining full control over the number. However, the number of recipients 
in a cluster is supposed to be smaller than the number referring to the restricted public. 
 
The dimension Conditions in this context will not be explicitly described, as it is not being extended 
and does not change from the IP Pledge taxonomy. Generally, as is the case in the IP Pledge taxonomy, 
conditions in the IP licensing taxonomy can vary but include territorial / field-of-use restrictions and 
limited durations. For instance, the Pilkington Group Ltd. licensed out its IPRs on the float glass 
technology only outside of the UK in order to facilitate the commercialization process on the one hand 
but to maintain control over the technology in their domestic market on the other hand (Al-Aali and 
Teece 2013).  
 
The IP licensing taxonomy is illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
                                                             
8  See for example Martin and Sunley (2003) for an overview of different definitions of the term cluster. 
 16
 
Figure 3: The IP licensing taxonomy. 
 
The taxonomy of IP Pledges with its 8 distinct types proposed in the last section constitutes the upper 
right cornerstone of the IP licensing taxonomy. Hereinafter, we provide examples for each of the eight 
remaining types, numbered 1-8, drawing on prior literature. 
 
1 Exclusive High-Priced IP  
Exclusive High-Priced IP represents a proprietary approach to an organisation’s IPRs. IP owners that 
employ this licensing strategy only share their IPRs for a high price to carefully selected parties, if at 
all. Exclusive High-Priced IP includes trade secrets, which can be seen as an own form of IP (Levin et al. 
1987) that has been given more attention over the last decades (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). A 
current firm which makes extensive use of trade secrets is the aerospace manufacturer SpaceX. In an 
interview from 2012, SpaceX’ CEO and CTO Elon Musk said that if the company published patents, 
Chinese competitors would have easy access to their technology (Harrison, Sullivan, and Davis 2012). 
Instead, in an industry where the application of reverse engineering is hampered, it might be better to 
not publish the knowledge through patents.  
Other examples for Exclusive High-Priced IP include Polaroid and Philips, for instance. Polaroid 
excluded its competitor Kodak from the instant camera industry in 1981 (Poltorak and Lerner 2004; 
Al-Aali and Teece 2013) and Philips used patents to maintain a monopoly over a specific shaving 
technology (Bogers, Bekkers, and Granstrand 2012). The academic literature often refers to this IP 
licensing type as a monopoly. Teece (1986) states that monopolies generally occur when firms seek to 
 17
commercialize protected inventions themselves. Hanel (2006) takes a more limiting view by saying 
that monopolies only occur when IPRs enable control over a specific product or production process.  
 
2 Exclusive Standard-Priced IP  
Exclusive Standard-Priced IP, in contrast to Exclusive High-Priced IP is characterized by a compensation 
that ranges closely around the mean WTP. Analogous to type 1, the IP owner allows only few third 
parties to access the respective IPRs. Exclusive licenses for different territories, which only allow one 
party (also excluding the licensor) the usage of IPRs in a specific area, are an example for Exclusive 
Standard-Priced IP. For instance, the initial polyester patent was exclusively licensed to Du Pont for 
exploitation in the U.S., while Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) held the exclusive license for the rest 
of the world (Rockett 1990). The former license is not high-priced, since its territorial restriction only 
allows for the usage in a specific market without the possibility to expand. 
 
3 Exclusive Low-Priced IP  
Exclusive Low-Priced IP is accessible only to selected parties at a price that is below the mean WTP. 
Organisations within this area are selective in terms of who is allowed to use their IPRs, but the 
respective IPRs are also reasonably priced or entirely free of charge. An example for an organisation 
that applied this IP licensing type is Hewlett-Packard (HP). With its wide range of products and a large 
number of competitors and suppliers, many of HP’s licensing activities did not primarily aim at 
revenue generation. Rather, it was its goal to establish long-term business partnerships that build upon 
low royalty-rates (Grindley and Teece 1997). Furthermore, open innovation collaborations with 
common IP transfers can be seen as another example (Chesbrough 2006). Lastly, cross-licensing 
agreements with or without additional royalty-payments, too, fall into this category. For instance, Intel 
and IBM both entered a cross-licensing covenant in the past, which licenses a major part of the 
respective firm’s IPRs to the other party (Shapiro 2001). It is important to note that cross-licensing 
agreements can include monetary compensation and are not automatically free of charge.  
 
4 Cluster-Specific High-Priced IP  
Cluster-Specific High-Priced IP is characterized by IPRs that are available to a cluster of organisations 
at a price that is higher than the mean WTP. In this context, HP, again, is worth being cited as an 
example. As Grindley and Teece (1997) point out, HP developed and owned IPRs that were not 
necessarily of strategic importance to them but that were important for other organisations of a 
specific cluster. In this context, HP licensed-out these IPRs in order to generate additional revenues. 
However, to keep the price high, the license had not been offered to the restricted or unrestricted 
public, in order to allow potential licensees to keep a competitive advantage. Here, HP focused on the 
monetization of IPRs rather than the development of long-term business partnerships which have 
been described in type number 3. Hence, this strategy can be applied when particular valuable IPRs 
that are of strategic importance to other organizations are concerned (also referred to as stick-licenses, 
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see for example Poltorak and Lerner (2004)). In contrast to an exclusive license, the IP owner licenses 
its IPRs to a cluster of organizations in order to maximise its revenues. However, to keep the 
competitive advantage and the price of the license high, not every interested party is granted a license. 
Another example are organisations active in the technology market. Qualcomm, for instance, faced 
high competition for producing handsets embodying its Code Division Multiple Accessibility (CDMA) 
technology. To increase revenues, Qualcomm focused on out-licensing the technology to specified 
clusters rather than producing the technology itself (Ashish Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001).  
 
5 Cluster-Specific Standard-Priced IP  
Cluster-Specific Standard-Priced IP refers to IPRs that are accessible to a cluster of third parties at a 
price that is close to the mean WTP. This type of the IP licensing taxonomy refers to the common 
licensing approach in which an organisation licenses its IPRs to third parties on a price that follows 
standard royalty-rates for this specific cluster (Ashish Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001). For 
instance, the Cambridge University spin-off Cambridge Display Technologies (CDT) develops light-
emitting plastics and initially tried to manufacture its products on its own (Eppinger 2015). Close to 
insolvency, CDT changed its business model and licensed-out the technology to entrenched 
manufacturers on royalty-rates that are considered as standard for this industry. The organisation 
needed fast revenues and had no core technology that would be essential for other firms. In order to 
survive, they offered a so-called carrot-license, meaning that they tried to incentivise others to buy a 
license (Poltorak and Lerner 2004).   
 
6 Cluster-Specific Low-Priced IP  
Cluster-Specific Low-Priced IP differs from IP Pledges in that the respective IPRs are made available to 
a specific cluster only. Closed patent pools are an example for this type. A closed patent pool allows its 
members to license patents from other members either for free or at reasonable costs (Maher 2016). 
For instance, the License on Transfer Network (LOT-Network) offers its members both, free and 
reasonable licenses, depending on the size of the licensee. LOT was founded by Google, Canon and 
RedHat and grants its members a license to about 1.2 million IPRs in case those rights are transferred 
to a patent assertion entity (PAE). Interested parties must join the LOT-Network and pay an annual fee 
for the membership. This fee depends on the annual revenue of firms and ranges from 0 US-Dollar (for 
firms that generate less than 25 million US-Dollar annually) to a maximum fee of 20.000 US-Dollar (for 
firms that generate more than 1 billion US-Dollar annually). Furthermore, a limited number of start-
ups receive access to royalty-free licenses of three patents of their choice.9 Importantly, only LOT-
members can benefit from these IPRs.  
 
                                                             
9  All information about the LOT-Network have been obtained from its official website at 
https://lotnet.com in December 2018.  
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7 Unexclusive High-Cost IP  
Unexclusive High-Cost IP refers to IPRs that are offered to the restricted or unrestricted public for a 
price that exceeds the mean WTP. The literature suggests that trivial patents which cover multiple 
constructive technologies can force entire industries into paying high royalty fees, as the example of 
Amazon’s 1-click patent from 1999 shows (Pohlmann and Opitz 2013; Bessen and Meurer 2009; 
Shapiro 2001). Examples also include non-practicing entities (NPEs, often referred to as Patent Trolls). 
NPEs license-out their IPRs to third parties under the threat of a litigation if the prospective licensee 
refuses to buy a license. Therefore, the compensation in this context is also influenced by the threat of 
an injunction (Pohlmann and Opitz 2013; Bessen and Meurer 2009; Diessel 2007). However, as 
Chesbrough (2006) concludes, NPEs can take many forms and seldom use a consistent business model. 
In sum, Unexclusive High-Cost IP occurs either as a consequence of trivial IPRs or due to IP owners with 
primarily monetary motives that seek to enforce royalty-payments. Typically, organisations that 
follow this approach are indifferent about the number of licensees, as long as they pay the price for it.  
 
8 Unexclusive Standard-Priced IP  
Unexclusive Standard-Priced IP is characterised by IPRs that are available to the restricted or 
unrestricted public at a price that is close to the mean WTP. Open patent pools, in contrast to closed 
patent pools described in type number 6 (Cluster-Specific Low-Priced IP), constitute an example for this 
licensing-approach. Open patent pools provide every interested third party with IP-packages at 
standard royalty rates. This is different from closed patent pools in the sense that an open patent pool 
does not require third parties to become a member. For instance, the patented technologies relating 
to the Moving Pictures Expert Group 2 (MPEG 2) and the Digital Versatile Disk (DVD) were being made 
available to the unrestricted public at standard royalty-rates through open patent pools (Eppinger 
2015). There was no restriction of potential licensees. Generally, type number 8 includes IPRs that 
constitute a standard (so called standard-essential patents or SEPs) and must be made available to the 
unrestricted public on FRAND-terms. An important characteristic is that, in order for licensing models 
to be termed Unexclusive Standard-Priced IP, they must be made available to the restricted or 
unrestricted public. Compared to type number 6, this unexclusiveness comes at a higher price.   
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Transitions through the IP licensing taxonomy over time 
The examples provided in the last section can convey the impression that organisations take a specific 
licensing-approach and maintain it until the respective IPRs lapse. However, many real-life examples 
suggest that organisations change their licensing-strategies over time and adopt different approaches. 
Furthermore, it is common knowledge that organisations diversify their IP licensing-strategies for 
different technologies. For instance, BP Chemicals licensed its IPRs relating to acetic acid only very 
selectively (if at all), whereas it tried to license its IPRs in the area of polyethylene aggressively (Arora, 
Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001).  
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We propose that the types within the IP Pledge taxonomy and the IP licensing taxonomy can be 
distinguished regarding their openness and closedness. We apply the terms open and closed in order to 
compare different types with each other. For instance, Cluster-Specific Low-Priced IP in the IP licensing 
taxonomy is more open with regards to the Accessibility and the Compensation than Exclusive 
Standard-Priced IP, for example. In contrast, it is more closed regarding the Accessibility than IP 
Pledges. Therefore, openness and closedness should always be defined with regards to the specific 
dimensions in the taxonomies. Subsequently, we describe some case examples for specific changes in 
openness of IP licensing.  
 
Transitions from closed to open 
Transitions towards more openness in IP licensing constitute common adaptations for organisations 
over time. For instance, Du Pont held a monopoly for moisture-proof cellophane in the 1930s and 
allowed only one other company, under a high-priced license, to use the technology. At this point, Du 
Pont’s licensing-approach falls into the category Exclusive High-Priced IP. After Dow Chemicals 
introduced a new packaging material, Du Pont offered licenses to parties that had previously, without 
success, requested a license for cellophane. The new licenses had been offered on very reasonable 
terms in order to enable a quick start and deter Dow Chemical’s entry into this specific market (Rockett 
1990). These new licensing-offers caused a transition of Du Pont’s licensing-strategy from Exclusive 
High-Priced IP to Cluster-Specific Low-Priced IP. Another example is Union Carbide. A major producer 
of ethylene glycol, the firm initially kept its own production process for glycol secret (Exclusive High-
Priced IP). Facing increased competition, Union Carbide started to license-out the process very 
selectively and caused the shift of their licensing-strategy to Exclusive Standard-Priced IP (Fosfuri 
2006). It should be noted that organisations do not always change their licensing-strategies 
voluntarily. AT&T, for instance, used its IPRs in the first 30 years after its foundation in 1885 in a closed 
manner in order to establish itself in the market. Forced by an antitrust consent decree in 1956, the 
firm was legally required to (openly) license all of its patents on reasonable royalty-rates far below 
market value (Grindley and Teece 1997). After the consent decree came to an end, AT&T returned to 
a more closed licensing approach, albeit not as closed as in its beginnings.  
 
Transitions from open to closed 
It is also conceivable that organisations start with an open approach and adopt a more closed strategy 
over time. A reason for this might be the attempt to initially accelerate diffusion- and adoption-rates 
of a technology protected and favoured by the licensor. Once the technology is established, the licensor 
can return to a proprietary strategy and recover competitive advantages. For example, Toyota’s IP 
Pledge for the royalty-free use of thousands of patents relating to fuel cell vehicles is only valid until 
2020. Therefore, until 2020, Toyota applies an IP Pledge. After this date, it is possible that the car 
manufacturer will demand royalty-fees for the usage of its patents, causing a shift to a more closed 
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type in the IP Licensing framework. Already over 30 years ago, this strategy has been described by 
Katz and Shapiro (1986) in the context of pricing strategies. The authors specifically describe 
penetration pricing in the early stages of a new technology to incentivise as many adopters as possible. 
Once consumers rely on this adopted technology, the organisation can regain profits by demanding 
higher prices at a later stage. This also explains why firms that apply IP Pledges keep their IPRs alive. 
If they gave up the protection, they could neither demand licensing-fees nor seek injunction at a later 
stage.  This constitutes an important distinction between IP donations and IP Pledges. Another 
example for a firm that shifted from open to closed licensing-strategies is Nippon Shokubai with its 
process for producing acrylic acid in the 1970s. As the company changed its business model from 
licensing IPRs to the production of acrylic acid, it tightened its attitude by licensing only to markets 
that it could not supply itself (Fosfuri 2006).  
 
Transitions along single dimensions 
It is not surprising that organisations adapt royalty-rates for their IPRs to changing competitive 
conditions and the altered value of its underlying technology (Grindley and Teece 1997). They can 
charge different rates for different licensees or, if the license agreement permits it, they can even 
change royalty-rates for the same licensee.10 For instance, the US-firm Alliacense forces third parties 
into licensing agreements under the threat of litigations and hence, qualifies as an NPE. As Pohlmann 
and Opitz (2013) point out, a particularity of this firm is that it offers early licensees’ lower royalty-
rates in order to incentivise rapid licenses. The authors state that if an influential company first agrees 
to the reduced license, others are urged to follow into the same licensing-agreements at a higher price. 
This licensing strategy constitutes the transition from Unexclusive Standard-Priced IP to Unexclusive 
High-Cost IP. Similarly, IP owners can change the number of potential recipients or can introduce or 
eliminate conditions for the IP-usage.  
 
                                                             
10  Grindley and Teece (1997) describe so-called fixed-period cross-licenses, which allow the renegotiation 
of licenses after a certain amount of time.  
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Figure 4: Selected paths through the IP Licensing Framework.11 
 
5.2 Further discussions and future research 
The inductive, qualitative research approach applied to the inconsistent raw data revealed notably 
consistent patterns. Even though some of the collected IP Pledges are merely short statements with a 
questionable legal validity, they invariably provide information about the price to access the IPRs as 
well as the potential recipients. Both are essential elements of every valid licensing-contract. In the 
majority of cases, the pledges are terms to conditions such as the restriction of use to a specified 
technology area. As mentioned earlier, most IP Pledges relate to the area of ICT. Therefore, we confirm 
the statement made by Asay et al. (2015) that most IP Pledges occur in information technology. 
Furthermore, this focus strengthens the connection between IP Pledges, Open Innovation and open 
source software.12 However, since the distinction between IP-protection and open source software is 
vague and also country-specific, future research must address this issue by incorporating open source 
software into the IP licensing taxonomy.  
 
Regarding the distribution of IP Pledges, it is noteworthy that the combination restricted – priced did 
not occur in our sample. This lack could be a consequence of an organisation’s intention that, when it 
decides to license out IPRs on standardized terms in return for monetary compensation, it does not 
want to exclude potential licensees to maximise its revenue streams. While we are confident that both 
                                                             
11  The positions of the arrows are derived from descriptions in the literature. The start and end points are 
estimated and should be seen as generalized demonstrations rather than exact illustrations.  
12  Da Silva (2017), for example, provides a review of the connection between Open Source Software and 
Open Innovation. 
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our taxonomies depict practical strategies that are actually used, our results are not definitive. 
Specifically, we aim to collect data about further IP Pledges in the future and aim to fill the gap of the 
restricted – priced – combination that our sample for the development of the IP Pledge taxonomy did 
not include. Future research should also aim towards a more detailed investigation of each individual 
type of IP Pledges, including the motives behind the respective approach and its fit for specific business 
models, for example.  
 
From a practical perspective, the development of the IP licensing taxonomy allows us to draw 
connections between firms that apply different business models. By way of example, while Alliacanse 
and Nippon Shokubai are two organisations with different approaches, they both transitioned to a 
more closed licensing-approach. The IP licensing taxonomy is a practical tool that allows for the 
illustration of multiple licensing-strategies within the direct business environment of organisations. 
In order to make this illustration more precise and transparent, prospective research should focus on 
ways to objectively quantify the values of the proposed dimensions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
IP Pledges are a phenomenon that has recently gained significant attention in both, the day-to-day 
businesses of organisations and the academic literature. A review of the existing literature has shown 
that the term IP Pledges is still missing a clear definition. We believe this is because the consideration 
of different types of IP Pledges has been, to a large extent, overlooked by industry professionals and 
academic scholars alike.  In general, not just IP Pledges but most IP licensing approaches suffer a lack 
of coherent definitions, which prohibits a clear distinction between licensing-strategies and the 
comparison of academic research. 
 
In this paper, we proposed an inductively derived definition of IP Pledges and Open IP, and therefore 
contribute to the ontology of IP licensing. Furthermore, we proposed a taxonomy of IP Pledges and an 
IP licensing taxonomy. Both models allow for a better distinction of existing licensing-strategies in 
today’s business environment and provide a coherent terminology. The taxonomy of IP Pledges 
classifies eight distinct types and allows for a coherent differentiation between licensing-approaches 
that, until now, have been roughly termed ‘IP Pledges’.  By extending two dimensions of the taxonomy 
of IP Pledges we draw an IP licensing framework, namely the IP licensing taxonomy, that brings 
together all common IP licensing-strategies that IP owners can choose from. Apart from the facilitated 
distinction between different approaches, the IP licensing taxonomy enables organisations to illustrate 
IP licensing-strategies from their surrounding business environment, including their direct 
competitors.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Unit of analysis. 
Organisations Date Number / type of IPRs Area of technology Type of IP Pledge 
Blackboad  13.03.2010 10 / patents (3 granted, 7 
pending applications) 
Internet based support 
systems 
Conditional Open IP 
Blockstream  19.07.2016 N/A / patents Blockstream Conditional Open IP 
Computer Associates, 
International  
09.2005 14 / patents Information Technology Conditional Open IP 
Eco-Patent Commons N/A 284 / patents ‘Green’ technology Conditional Open IP 
Google open patent non-
assertion pledge (OPN)  
Status: February 2019 202 / patents Information technology Conditional Open IP 
GreenXchange (research 
non-exempt option) 
N/A N/A / patents ‘Green’ technology Conditional Open IP 
GreenXchange (standard 
plus option / conditions 
only) 
N/A N/A / patents ‘Green’ technology Conditional Open IP 
iBiquity (free license) 13.04.2005 N/A / patents Standards for transmission 
equipment that 
implements NRSC-5 
Conditional Open IP 
IBM  11.01.2005 500+ / patents Information technology Conditional Open IP 
IBM  13.07.2007 N/A / N/A Specifically named 
specifications 
Conditional Open IP 
IBM  24.10.2005 N/A / patents Healthcare / Education Conditional Open IP 
Microsoft  11.2005 N/A / patents Microsoft Office 2003 XML 
reference schemas 
Conditional Open IP 
Microsoft  12.09.2006 N/A / patents Various specifications Conditional Open IP 
Nokia  25.05.2005 N/A / patents Linux technology Conditional Open IP 
Open Invention Network 
(OIN)  
Status: February 2019 750+ / patents Linux technology Conditional Open IP 
Open Web Foundation 
(OWF) 0.9  
Status: November 2018 N/A / copyrights Emerging web 
technologies 
Conditional Open IP 
Open Web Foundation 
(OWF) 1.0  
Status: November 2018 N/A / patents Emerging web 
technologies 
Conditional Open IP 
Organisations contributing 
to QR-Code technology 
N/A 9 / patents 
1 / trademark 
QR-Code technology Conditional Open IP 
RedHat  29.05.2002 N/A / patents Software Conditional Open IP 
Southern California Edison  2008 1 / patent Method of communicating 
between a utility and its 
customer locations 
Conditional Open IP 
Sun Microsystems  30.09.2005 N/A / patents Open document standards Conditional Open IP 
Tesla Motors  June 2014  
Status: February 2019 
361 / patents Electric vehicles and 
related technology 
Conditional Open IP 
Apple  11.11.2011 N/A / patents Cellular technology Conditional Priced IP 
Google  08.02.2012 N/A / patents All existing licenses after 
the acquisition of Motorola 
Mobility Holdings, Inc. 
Conditional Priced IP 
GreenXchange (standard 
plus option / payment and 
conditions) 
N/A N/A / patents ‘Green’ technology Conditional Priced IP 
iBiquity (FRAND-license) 13.04.2005 N/A / patents Transmission equipment 
that implements NRSC-5 
(no standard) 
Conditional Priced IP 
Intel  17.02.2018 N/A / patents ‘Industry Standards’ Conditional Priced IP 
Microsoft  07.2006 N/A / patents Operating system 
inventions 
Conditional Priced IP 
Microsoft  08.02.2012 N/A / patents Standard technologies Conditional Priced IP 
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Organisations Date Number / type of IPRs Area of technology Type of IP Pledge 
Microsoft (Interoperability 
commitment general 
provisions) 
16.12.2009 N/A / patents Public standards in 
Microsoft’s relevant 
software products 
Conditional Priced IP 
Nokia  08.05.2002 N/A / patents W-CDMA technology Conditional Priced IP 
Nokia  2010 N/A / patents Standards around long-
term evolution and service 
architecture evolution  
Conditional Priced IP 
Qualcomm  08.12.2013 N/A / patents Standards for CDMA-based 
telecommunication 
Conditional Priced IP 
Samsung  27.09.2013 N/A / patents UMTS standards Conditional Priced IP 
Vodafone  2017 N/A / N/A Mobile network 
technologies 
Conditional Priced IP 
CMAF  2013 1 / patent Fraud protection method Conditional Restricted IP 
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft 
zur Förderung der 
Wissenschaften e.V.  
2006 2 / patents RNA interference 
mediating small RNA 
molecules  
Conditional Restricted IP 
Microsoft  03.12.2003 N/A / patents Microsoft Office 2003 XML 
reference schemas 
Conditional Restricted IP 
Microsoft (Interoperability 
commitment Subject D.) 
16.12.2009 N/A / patents Interoperability 
information 
Conditional Restricted IP 
Microsoft  21.02.2008 N/A / patents Technology relating to 
open source compatibility 
Conditional Restricted IP 
Microsoft (Open 
Specification / Community 
Promise) 
30.09.2013 N/A / patents Specifications for protocols 
that are used by Windows 
server operating systems 
to interoperate with 
Windows client operating 
systems 
Conditional Restricted IP 
MIT, Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft zur Förderung 
der Wissenschaften e. V., 
The Whitehead Institute 
for Biomedical Research, 
University of 
Massachusettes,  
2006 11 / patents RNA sequence-specific 
mediators of RNA 
interference 
Conditional Restricted IP 
Monsanto  2014 N/A / patents Patented seed and traits Conditional Restricted IP 
Myriad Genetics  2014 N/A / patents Healthcare Conditional Restricted IP 
Toyota  2015 5680 / patents Fuel cell stacks, high-
pressure hydrogen tanks, 
fuel cell system software 
control, hydrogen 
production and supply 
Conditional Restricted IP 
Gatespace Telematics, IBM, 
Nokia, ProSyst Software, 
Samsung  
26.07.2006 N/A / patents OSGi Service Platform 
Release 4 
Open IP 
GreenXchange (standard 
option) 
N/A N/A / patents ‘Green’ technology Open IP 
IBM  26.09.2006 100+ / patents Business-methods Open IP 
Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, 
NEC, NextWave Wireless, 
Nokia, Nokia Siemens 
Networks and Sony 
Ericsson  
14.04.2008 N/A / N/A 3GPP Long Term Evolution 
and Service Architecture 
Evolution (LTE/SAE) 
Priced IP 
Ericsson  12.01.2012 N/A / patents Mainly wireless technology Priced IP 
Ericsson  27.11.2012 N/A / patents Informationn technology Priced IP 
Ford  28.05.2015 1650 / patents (650 
granted, 1000 pending 
applications) 
Electric vehicles and 
related technologies 
Priced IP 
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Organisations Date Number / type of IPRs Area of technology Type of IP Pledge 
GreenXchange (standard 
plus option / payment 
only) 
N/A N/A / patents ‘Green’ technology Priced IP 
Microsoft   03.12.2003 N/A / patents Clear Type Technology and 
FAT File system 
Priced IP 
Microsoft (Open Source 
Compatibility)  
21.02.2008 N/A / patents Technologies relating to 
Microsoft’s ‘Open 
Protocols’ 
Priced IP 
NTT DoCoMo, Ericsson, 
Nokia, Siemens, Fujitsu, 
Matsushita 
Communication Industrial 
(Panasonic), Mitsubishi 
Electric, NEC and Sony 
Corporation  
06.11.2002 N/A / patents W-CDMA technology Priced IP 
Microsoft (Free for 
windows-based 
application developer)  
03.12.2003 N/A / N/A Technology relating to web 
standards 
Restricted IP 
Sun Microsystems  31.01.2005 1600 / patents Technology relating to Sun 
OpenSolaris 
Restricted IP 
www.thepatentpledge.org  Status: November 2018 N/A / patents Software Restricted IP 
 
 
 
 
 
